Fiduciary duty under the microscope : stewardship and the spectrum of pension fund engagement. by Tilba,  Anna & Reisberg,  Arad
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
22 January 2019
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Tilba, Anna and Reisberg, Arad (2019) 'Fiduciary duty under the microscope : stewardship and the spectrum
of pension fund engagement.', Modern law review., 82 (3). 456487.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12413
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is the accepted version of the following article: Tilba, Anna Reisberg, Arad (2019). Fiduciary Duty under the
Microscope: Stewardship and the spectrum of Pension Fund Engagement. Modern Law Review 82(3): 456-487, which
has been published in ﬁnal form at https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12413. This article may be used for
non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 1  
  
Fiduciary Duty under the Microscope: Stewardship and the Spectrum of Pension 
Fund Engagement 
By: Anna Tilba* and Arad Reisberg 
 
ABSTRACT  
This study examines how UK pension fund trustees interpret the concept of their 
fiduciary duties in practice and how these interpretations may shape pension fund 
approaches to corporate stewardship and engagement as envisioned by the UK 
Stewardship Code. Using the data from 35 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 
pension fund trustees, executives, investment intermediaries and a series of round-table 
discussions with pensions experts, the study uncovers interpretive pluralism of the 
concept of Fiduciary Duty in the area of pension funds. A model identifying the 
spectrum of pension fund engagement is developed, showing how different 
interpretations of fiduciary duty may be linked to various intensity and methods of 
engagement in practice. The findings help disambiguate the concept of ‘fiduciary duty’, 
highlighting the challenges of Stewardship Code application in practice. These insights 
are very relevant to the ongoing revisions of the Stewardship Code and further policy 
clarifications of the nature of fiduciary duty by the UK Financial Conduct Authority. 
This paper encourages trustees, regulators and others to consider closely what role 
pension fund trustees should have in stewardship, which may not be directly relevant 
to their fiduciary duties as trustees.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Institutional investors1 are said to be pivotal to two vital dimensions of modern 
capital markets, firstly for the value of public corporations they own, and secondly, for 
the financial security of savers who invest through them.  Regulators count on 
institutional investors to help police the market against the risk of either repeat systemic 
crimes and fraud or CEO pay rising. Yet, in the wake of the Financial Crisis of 2007-
2008 institutional investors were repeatedly blamed for being part of the problem that 
lead to the market crash. In particular, their passivity, lax engagement and disinterest in 
exercising proper oversight of their investee companies were heavily criticized.2 In the 
aftermath of the crisis and the governance reviews that followed3, the concept of a 
‘Fiduciary Duty’ was hastily (and perhaps inappropriately) put forward as a legal and 
practical platform that could guide the development of institutional investor practices, 
                                                 
1 The Code defines “institutional investors” as asset owners and asset managers with equity holdings in 
UK listed companies. Asset owners are defined in the Code to include pension funds, insurance 
companies, investment trusts and other collective investment vehicles. As the providers of capital, asset 
owners set the tone for stewardship and may influence behavioural changes that lead to better 
stewardship by asset managers and companies. Asset managers as defined as those with day-to-day 
responsibility for managing investments on behalf of the asset owners and are in a position to influence 
companies’ long-term performance through stewardship. Page 2, Para. 2 and Page 1, Para. 6. 
2 A Reisberg, 'The UK stewardship code: On the road to nowhere?' (2015) 2 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies, 217.   
3 For the overview of the development of the Stewardship Code see B. Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship 
Code's Achilles' Heel’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 1004, and Reisberg,  'The UK stewardship code: 
On the road to nowhere?' (2015) 2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 217.   
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particularly those relating to extending the stewardship role vis-a-vis investee firms4. 
The success of this approach was dependent to a great extent on the large number of 
investors such as asset managers, insurance companies and pension funds to be actively 
engaged with the companies. From this perspective, the diligent exercise of shareholder 
stewardship5 became essential to reinforce the ‘comply or explain’ effects of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code6.    
Although no longer the largest group of investors in the UK market, pension 
funds7 are considered both by scholars and policymakers to be particularly significant 
for stewardship because of their ‘patient capital’, which is designed (in theory) to 
                                                 
4 J. Hawley, A. Hoepner, K. Johnson, J. Sandberg, and E. Waitzer ‘Cambridge Handbook of Institutional 
Investment and Fiduciary Duty’ (2014) Cambridge University Press; Financial Reporting Council, The 
Stewardship Code, (2012) https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b603-
3d24b2f62c5f/UK-Stewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf (last visited 15 April 2018), London; J Kay, 
The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making (July 2012).  
5 The Code defines “stewardship” as “For the investor, stewardship aims to promote the long-term 
success of companies in such a way that the ultimate providers of capital also prosper. For investors, 
stewardship is more than just voting. Activities may include monitoring and engaging with companies 
on matters such as strategy, performance, risk, capital structure, and corporate governance, including 
culture and remuneration. Engagement is purposeful dialogue with companies on these matters as well 
as on issues that are the immediate subject of votes at general meetings.” Code, Page 1, Para. 4. 
6 Reisberg, , 'The UK stewardship code: On the road to nowhere?' (2015) 2 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies, 217.   
7 Davies indicates that the beneficial share ownership of UK equities by pension funds has steadily 
been decreasing from the peak of 31.7% in 1993 to only 4.7% in 2012. P. Davies, ‘Shareholders in the 
United Kingdom’ (2015) ECGI Working Paper Series in Law 27.    
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generate returns for their beneficiaries over the longer term.8 However, a host of barriers 
seem to prevent all but a handful of funds9 from meeting the expectations placed on 
them as ‘owners’ of public corporations. Alongside the more obvious barriers such as 
dispersed share ownership and the associated problems of co-ordination, management 
and control; free-rider problems,10 other problems of diversification; rational apathy 
and informational deficit11 have been pointed out. The long chain of intermediaries from 
                                                 
8 L. Ryan and M. Schneider, ‘The Antecedents of Institutional Investor Activism’ (2002) 27 Academy 
of Management 4, 554-573; S. Davis, J. Lukomnik and D. Pitt-Watson, ‘The New Capitalists: How 
Citizen Investors are Reshaping the Corporate Agenda’ (2006) Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business  
School Press; R. Martin, P. Casson and T. Nisar, ‘Investor Engagement: Investors and Management  
Practice Under Shareholder Value’ (2007) Oxford University Press; Financial Reporting Council, The 
Kay Review (2012). The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making. 
[available at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/k/12-631-kay-review-of-equity-
markets-interim-report.pdf ] 
9 It should be noted here that, if constituted as a trust the pension fund is not a separate legal person but 
only acts through its trustees. 
10 Martin, P. Casson and T. Nisar, ‘Investor Engagement: Investors and Management Practice Under 
Shareholder Value’ (2007) Oxford University Press; A. Schäfer and U. von Arx, ‘The Influence of 
Pension Funds on Corporate Governance’ (2014) 46 Applied Economics 19, 2316.  
11 Reisberg. A, 'The UK stewardship code: On the road to nowhere?' (2015) 2 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies, 232.  
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ultimate beneficial interests through to the investee company also represent a significant 
barrier to engagement.12 13 
In the context of the FRC’s ongoing review of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code14 and the Stewardship Code (2012)15, it seems that the commitment to these 
general principles seems to be much easier to achieve at a theoretical level than in 
practice. Various commentators and regulators have asked why shareholders have not 
exercised more control over investee companies. Lord Myners (then the Financial 
                                                 
12 J Rhee, ‘Short-Termism of Institutional Investors and the Double Agency Problem’ (9 May 2013) 
HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/05/09/short-termism-of-institutional-investors-and-the-double-
agency-problem/ [last visited 17 January 2019]; A. Tilba and T. McNulty, ‘Engaged versus Disengaged 
Ownership: The Case of Pension Funds in the UK’ (2013) 21 Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 21(2):165-182. 
13  A. Tilba and J. Wilson, ‘Vocabularies of Motive and Temporal Perspectives: Examples of Pension 
Fund Engagement and Disengagement’ (2017) British Journal of Management, 11.   
14 FRC, (December, 2017) Proposed Revisions to the UK Corporate Governance Code at:   
https://frc.org.uk/getattachment/f7366d6f-aa57-4134-a409-1362d220445b/;.aspx [last visited 12 March, 
2018]. 
 
15 FRC, The Annual Review of Corporate Governance and Reporting 2017/2018 (October 2018) 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/f70e56b9-7daf-4248-a1ae-a46bad67c85e/Annual-Review-of-CG-
R-241018.pdf  [last visited: November 12, 2018]. 
The UK Stewardship Code (2012) https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b603-
3d24b2f62c5f/UK-Stewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf  [last visited 30 April 2017].  
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Services Secretary to the Treasury) described institutional investors as “absentee 
landlords” and stated that institutional investor inactivity had contributed to what he 
termed the “ownerless corporation.”16 An OECD Report (February 2011)17 on the  
contributing causes of the global financial crisis concluded that institutional investors 
were generally not effective in monitoring investee companies. At present, companies 
like BHS, Carillion, which has 13 pension schemes, GKN (with the hostile takeover bid 
by Melrose) British Steel/Tata, and Toys R Us, lead to questions being asked about the 
monitoring role of the pension trustees and the Pensions Regulator, particularly in light 
of increasing pension deficits and yet continuous dividend payments to shareholders.   
A number of scholars have begun to question the effectiveness of the UK 
Stewardship Code itself arguing that it lacks the capacity to achieve its goals.18 Active 
pension fund trustees’ involvement in corporate governance thus appears more assumed 
than demonstrated, while the motivations behind these contrasting approaches to equity 
ownership necessitate further investigation.  Despite reforms and continuous 
                                                 
16 Lord Myners, ‘Association of Investment Companies’(April 2009), at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20091207163737/http://hmtreasury.gov.uk/speech_fsst_2104
09.htm [last visited 7 April 2018].   
17  OECD (2011), The Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Good Corporate Governance, 
Corporate Governance, page 9. 
18 B. Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship Code's Achilles' Heel’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 1004; D. 
Arsalidou, ‘Institutional Investors, behavioural economics and the concept of Stewardship’ (2012) 6 
Law and Financial Market Review 6, 410; Reisberg. A, 'The UK stewardship code: On the road to 
nowhere?' (2015) 2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies; Tilba. A. and Wilson, J.F. (2017). Vocabularies 
of Motive and Temporal Perspectives: Examples of Pension Fund Engagement and Disengagement.  
British Journal of Management, 28(3), 1-17, p. 13.  
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development of best practices in corporate governance, little attention has been placed 
specifically on the governance of pension schemes. While good pension scheme 
governance is, indeed, essential, there is a necessary precursor, that the purpose of the 
scheme and the responsibilities of the trustees be well-defined and understood. 
However, there are still serious omissions in these debates, which this study aims to 
help address.  
Furthermore, pension fund trustees are legally bound by common law fiduciary 
duty, which requires trustees to proceed with prudence and to act in the best interests of 
the beneficiaries. Notwithstanding recently heightened attention and expectations 
placed on fiduciary duties, our understanding of how this central concept shapes pension 
fund trustees’19 approaches to investment is still lacking in clarity both in academic 
research and practice20. The lack of clarification around ‘fiduciary duties’ continues to 
be a topic of significant interest to the policy makers as evident from the ongoing 
Financial Conduct Authority’s discussion paper on the Duty of Care and potential 
                                                 
19 It should be noted that in English law, a trust is not a separate legal entity from the personalities of its 
trustees. 
20 J. Sandberg, ‘(Re-)Interpreting Fiduciary Duty to Justify Socially Responsible Investment for  
Pension Funds. (2013) 21 Corporate Governance: An International Review, 436; UK Law  
Commission, 2014 Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries  
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/lc350_fiduciary_duties.pdf [last visited 15 April  
2018]; J. Hawley, A. Hoepner, K. Johnson, J. Sandberg, and E. Waitzer ‘Cambridge Handbook of 
Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty’ (2014) Cambridge University Press. 
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alternative approaches 21 . To my knowledge, no studies have yet empirically 
investigated how pension fund trustees interpret and apply the concept of fiduciary 
duties in their investment practices and how it shapes their approach to stewardship and 
engagement.   
This study contributes to the scarce literature on pension fund governance and 
shareholder engagement in several respects. Theoretically, this paper answers calls to 
disambiguate the concept of ‘fiduciary duty’22 by developing a model, which identifies 
a range of interpretations of fiduciary duty and relating them to specific forms and 
methods of pension fund stewardship and corporate engagement. This article reveals 
varying degrees of pension fund engagement and financial focus. Four distinct 
interpretations and approaches are emerging: Disengagement, Employer Engagement, 
Fund Manager Engagement and Corporate Engagement.   
These empirical findings suggest that trustees have different understandings of 
their role and of the purpose of a pension fund. The findings reveal the interconnection 
of the legal responsibilities and how trustees interpret these responsibilities and 
                                                 
21 Financial Conduct Authority (2018) Discussion paper on the duty of care and potential alternative 
approaches https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/dp-18-05.pdf  [last visited on 30 October 
2018].  
22 J. Sandberg, ‘(Re-)Interpreting Fiduciary Duty to Justify Socially Responsible Investment for  
Pension Funds. (2013) 21 Corporate Governance: An International Review, 436; UK Law  
Commission, 2014 Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries  
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/lc350_fiduciary_duties.pdf  [last visited 15 April  
2018]; J. Hawley, A. Hoepner, K. Johnson, J. Sandberg, and E. Waitzer ‘Cambridge Handbook of 
Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty’ (2014) Cambridge University Press. 
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stewardship and engagement. More specifically, there is a distinct tension between 
trustees’ stewardship responsibilities and the exclusive focus on financial performance 
within pension funds, where stewardship seems to pull trustees in a different direction 
from what they consider to be the purpose of a pension fund (i.e. focusing on generating 
financial returns and securing retirement income, not fixing corporate governance 
problems). Ultimately, this paper contributes to the ongoing policy debates concerning 
investor stewardship and fiduciary duties within the investment chain by revealing 
challenges of using the concept of fiduciary duty as a tool of corporate governance.  In 
so doing, the findings raise questions about the levels of pension fund compliance with 
the Stewardship Code in the spirit that it was originally intended.  
The paper is structured as follows: it begins with a brief introduction of the UK 
Stewardship Code, highlighting some of the challenges of institutional compliance with 
the Code. Focusing on pension funds, this study looks at the trustee’s fiduciary duties 
as an essential but little explored concept which is closely linked to pension fund 
compliance with the Stewardship Code.  The paper then draws on the qualitative data 
and develops a spectrum of pension fund engagement, which outlines different forms 
and methods of pension fund engagement, linking them to trustees’ interpretations of 
their fiduciary duties. This model exposes not only variations in pension fund ownership 
behaviour, but also explains why such variations may exist. The Discussion elaborates 
on the contribution of this study to current corporate governance debates on the nature 
of fiduciary duty and institutional investor engagement. Policy Implications highlight 
the challenges of Stewardship Code application in the pension fund context and offer 
further clarifications on ‘fiduciary duty’ and how it can be applied in practice in relation 
to the Stewardship Code.    
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THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE  
The UK has long been seen as an international leader in the development of successful 
non-statutory and voluntary guidance and codes of best practice relating to corporate 
affairs. 23  Practitioners and policymakers have been placing greater emphasis 
particularly on institutional investors to be more active in corporate governance. In the 
US this is evident from The Conference Board reports,24  whilst in the UK the recent 
financial crisis served to heighten the expectations of policy-makers that institutional 
investors should be acting as stewards and engaged owners of shares.22 In February 
2009 Sir David Walker was commissioned to review the governance of banks and 
related entities25. This review highlighted that:                                                           
 ‘while institutional investors could not have prevented the [financial] 
crisis, …with hindsight it seems clear that…board and director 
shortcomings…would have been tackled more effectively had there been 
                                                 
23 For the historic overview of the development of these codes see B. Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship Code's 
Achilles' Heel’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 1004;  
and A. Tilba, (2016) Evolution of UK Corporate Ownership and Control: Governance, Complexity and 
Context. In: JF Wilson, JFS. Toms; A de Jong, E. Buchnea, ed. The Routledge Companion to Business 
(2017) History, Abington, Oxon: Routledge, 300. 
24 e.g. M. Tonello, ‘Revisiting Stock Market Short-Termism’ (2006) The Conference Board Report No.  
R-1386-06-RR.  The Conference Board is a non-partisan, global, independent business membership and 
research association working in the public interest. See https://www.conference-
board.org/about/index.cfm?id=1980 [last visited 24 April 2018]. 
25 D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities: 
Final Recommendations (HM Treasury 2009), 71-72, at 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf 
[last visited 7 April 2018]. 
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more vigorous scrutiny and engagement by major investors acting as 
owners26   
By 2010 this pro-intervention perspective was embodied in the semi-official UK 
Stewardship Code, which consisted of seven principles very similar to the Institutional 
Shareholders’ Committee and was informally enforced on the ‘comply or explain’ basis. 
In the same spirit, the report by Professor John Kay27 in 2012 has been highly critical 
of the way UK equity markets have been geared towards generating short-term 
investment profits. Prof. Kay emphasized the need for a shift towards long-term and 
fiduciary standards28, necessitating loyalty and prudence within the investment world. 
Part of the financial services industry seems to have committed itself to do better as 
there were over 1600 signatories with more than EUR 60 trillion in assets under 
management as of December 2016 to the United Nations sponsored Principles for 
                                                 
26 [last visited 7 April 2018].   
27 John Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making. Final Report, 
July, 2012 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/2534
54/bis-12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf [last visited 18 October 2018]. 
28 Kay set out as one of his Principles the applicable fiduciary standard as follows: “All participants in 
the equity investment chain should observe fiduciary standards in their relationships with their clients 
and customers. Fiduciary standards require that the client’s interests are put first, that conflict of interest 
should be avoided, and that the direct and indirect costs of services provided should be reasonable and 
disclosed. These standards should not require, nor even permit, the agent to depart from generally 
prevailing standards of decent behaviour. Contractual terms should not claim to override these 
standards.” Ibid. p. 65.  
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Responsible Investment.29 Similarly, the directive of non-financial reporting by the 
European Union encouraged institutional investors to be active owners, which means 
incorporating environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues within their 
investment strategies and practices.30   
Thus, institutional investor engagement and activism has become a desirable 
activity in public policy terms.31 However, commitment to these general principles 
seems to be much easier to achieve at a theoretical or strategic level than in daily 
operations and practices as there seems to be a variety of definitions of what 
                                                 
29 United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI), 2016. Signatories to the Principles 
for Responsible Investment. https://www.unpri.org/signatories  [10 December 2017] (last visited 15 
April 2018).  
30  European Union (EU). Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
Information by Certain Large Undertakings and Groups. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0095  [10 December 2017] (last visited 15 
Aprl 2018); European Union (EU). 2014b. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of Long-Term Shareholder 
Engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Certain Elements of the Corporate Governance 
Statement, COM/2014/0213 final – 2014/0121 (COD). http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3Ab2014%3A213%3AFIN  [10 December 2017] (last 
visited 15 Aprl 2018). October 2014 Amending Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-
financial and Diversity https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0095 
[last visited:15 April 2018].  
31 Davies, P. (2015). Shareholders in the United Kingdom. ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, nr. 
280/2015,18.   
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‘Stewardship’ really means.32 The 2012 Stewardship Code was promoted at European 
Union level by the European Commission 33  but it contained no definition of 
stewardship and so it was vague as to whether the Code was confined to securing good 
corporate governance in investee companies or extended to intervention to secure 
changes in managerial policy. 
The distinctive elements of stewardship behaviour involve a ‘shared sense of 
ongoing responsibility to multiple stakeholders, which affects a focus on collective 
welfare over the long term.’34 In the context of institutional investors, ‘stewardship’ is 
used as to encourage the long-term success of companies by protecting and enhancing 
the value of the firm to the ultimate benefit of an investor (Stewardship Code, 2012).   
The EU Corporate Governance Framework, Green Paper 35  suggests that 
“Shareholder engagement is generally understood as actively monitoring companies, 
engaging in a dialogue with the company’s board, and using shareholder rights, 
including voting and cooperation with other shareholders, if need be to improve the 
                                                 
32 Reisberg. A, 'The UK stewardship code: On the road to nowhere?' (2015) 2 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies, 228.   
33  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee of the Regions Action Plan: European company law and corporate 
governance - a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies /* 
COM/2012/0740 final */, Para. 2.4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0740 [last visited: 16 April 2018].  
34 Hernandez, M. (2012). Toward an Understanding of the Psychology of Stewardship. Academy of 
Management Review, 37(2), 176.  
35 Green Paper (2011) The EU corporate governance framework /* COM(2011) 164 final  https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52011DC0164 [last visited 7 April 2018].  
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governance of the investee company in the interests of long-term value creation.”36 The 
2009 Walker Review of corporate governance in banks and financial companies 
suggests that “the term ‘engagement’ relates to procedures designed to ensure that 
shareholders derive value from their holdings by dealing effectively with concerns 
about under-performance.” 37  This includes: arrangements for monitoring investee 
companies; arrangements for meeting as appropriate with a company’s chairman or 
senior management; a strategy for intervention where judged appropriate, and policy on 
voting and voting disclosure. The UK Law Commission report on Fiduciary Duties of 
Investment Intermediaries in 2014 defines stewardship activities as including the 
monitoring of and engaging with companies on matters such as strategy, performance, 
risk, capital structure and corporate governance, including culture and remuneration.38 
All in all, the development of these ‘soft’ codes and increasing expectations on investors 
to become involved in corporate governance has consequently assumed certain 
benchmarks of success or failure to ‘comply or explain’.   
                                                 
36 (April, 2011), para. 2.1.   
37 D. Walker (2009), A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry 
Entities: Final Recommendations (HM Treasury 2009), 71-72  
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf , 
para 5, 14 [last visited: 17 January 2019].  
38 UK Law Commission (2014) Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/lc350_fiduciary_duties.pdf , xiv.  [last visited: 15 
April 2018].  
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Historically, through equity ownership, pension funds represented an important 
class of institutional investors who were potentially in a position to play a significant 
role in the evolution of UK ownership.39 Subsequently, academics and policy makers 
showed great interest in pension fund engagement activities and their outcomes within 
corporate governance literature. However, whether stewardship can bear the weight 
placed upon it is not yet clear as there is a mixed empirical research of both engagement 
and disengagement by institutional investors.40 Most recent academic reviews of the 
current state of shareholder activism literature suggest that the research on shareholder 
engagement (both financial and social) offers conflicting perspectives on this topic, 
calling for more research into more relational and behavioural aspects of investor 
activities to explain investor ‘exit’ or voice’.41  
The low level of shareholder activism in the UK is notable, which raises 
questions of the strength of the incentives for UK shareholders to coordinate and 
exercise their shareholder powers, particularly directly intervening in company 
                                                 
39 J. Franks, C. Mayer, and S. Rossi, ‘Ownership: Evolution and Regulation’ (2005) Social Science 
Research Network, 4009; Davies, P. (2015). Shareholders in the United Kingdom. ECGI Working Paper 
Series in Law, nr. 280/2015, 2.    
40 For a review of recent literature about pension fund engagement and disengagement see Tilba. A. and 
Wilson, J.F. (2017). Vocabularies of Motive and Temporal Perspectives: Examples of Pension Fund 
Engagement and Disengagement.  British Journal of Management, 28(3), 2-3.   
41 M. Goranova and L. Ryan, ‘Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary Review’ (2014) 40 Journal of 
Management, 5, 1230-1268; T. McNulty and D. Nordberg, ‘Ownership, Activism and Engagement:  
Institutional Investors as Active Owners’ (2016) 24 Corporate Governance: An International Review’ 
3, 335.  
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management, even in the presence of a shareholder-friendly set of governance rules.42  
Schäfer and von Arx note that such disengagement can be explained by the largely 
dispersed share ownership of pension funds and free rider problems.43 Tilba, et. al. also 
found that the vast majority of UK pension funds are disengaged owners who focus 
primarily on investment return generation at the expense of corporate governance 
considerations.44   
The existing empirical studies cast doubt on the applicability of the Stewardship 
Code. Moreover, a number of academics have begun to articulate concerns about the 
ability of the Code to encourage ‘engaged ownership’ by institutional investors. For 
example, Cheffins argues that it is unlikely that the Stewardship Code will be able to 
foster substantially greater shareholder involvement in UK corporate governance due 
to sustained fragmentation of share ownership occurring over recent decades. 45  
Arsalidou argues that behavioural economics casts doubts on the capacity of 
institutional investors to act rationally and in accordance with these ideas, challenging 
                                                 
42 Davies, P. (2015). Shareholders in the United Kingdom. ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, nr. 
280/2015, 2.   
43 A. Schäfer and U. von Arx, ‘The Influence of Pension Funds on Corporate Governance’ (2014) 46 
Applied Economics 19, 2316.  
44 Tilba, A and McNulty, T. (2013). Engaged versus Disengaged Ownership: The Case of Pension 
Funds in the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21, p. Tilba. A. and Wilson, J.F. 
(2017). Vocabularies of Motive and Temporal Perspectives: Examples of Pension Fund Engagement 
and Disengagement.  British Journal of Management, 28(3), 7.  
45 B. Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship Code's Achilles' Heel’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review, 1004.  
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the assumption that the Code will succeed.46 Reisberg goes further and suggests that the 
Stewardship Code is ‘trivial, absent of meaning ad incapable of achieving its goals’47 
because pension fund trustees demonstrate a kind of rational (or irrational) reticence 
when it comes to stewardship and engagement.  
Clearly, limited research on pension fund governance focuses on the types of 
pension fund engagement activities as variables, relating them to specific outcomes at 
the expense of shedding light on the motivations that underpin such behaviour. 
Therefore, it is now crucial to have a broader awareness of trustees’ understanding of a 
purpose of a pension scheme and their duties in relation to that trust. 
PENSION FUND GOVERNANCE AND ORGANISATIONAL ETHOS  
There are only a few studies that identify weaknesses and flaws in the pension 
funds’ own governance and accountability mechanisms, as a contributory factor in the 
investor’s failure to exercise the desired shareowner stewardship. For example, the lack 
                                                 
46 D. Arsalidou, ‘Institutional Investors, behavioural economics and the concept of Stewardship’ (2012) 
6 Law and Financial Market Review 6, 415.  
47 Reisberg, 'The UK stewardship code: On the road to nowhere?' (2015) 2 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies, 217 and 241.   
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of investment expertise on trustee boards48, pension fund size49 , and the influence of 
strong-willed and/or more experienced board members or the CEOs of the corporate 
sponsor who may prioritise the interests of the corporate sponsor above all else.50 These 
studies, however, provide limited explanations of what motivates shareholder 
behaviour.  For example, Aguilera, et. al. find that some institutional investors in the 
UK have significantly increased the level of involvement with their investee companies, 
putting forward instrumental (self-driven), relational (group-oriented and legitimising) 
and moral (appropriate behaviour) motives exemplifying the Corporate Social 
Reasonability (CSR) activities of the UK’s Universities Superannuation Scheme 
                                                 
48 Myners Report (2001). Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review.  London: HM 
Treasury, United Kingdom; G.Clark, E. Carlewy-Smith, and J. Marshall, ‘The Consistency of UK 
Pension Fund Trustee Decision-Making’ (2007) 6 Journal of Pension Economic and Finance 1,  
67; G. Clark, and R. Urwin, ‘Leadership, Collective Decision-Making, and Pension Fund Governance’  
(2008) available at:, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133015   [last visited 15  
Aprl 2018)]. Tilba, A and McNulty, T. (2013). Engaged versus Disengaged Ownership: The Case of 
Pension Funds in the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21, 173-174.  
49 T. Noe, ‘Investor Activism and Financial Market Structure’ (2002) 15 Review of Financial Studies 1,  
289; R. Dharwadkar,  M. Goranova,  P. Brandes, and R. Khan, ‘Institutional Ownership and  
Monitoring Effectiveness: It’s Not Just How Much but What Else You Own’ (2008)  19 Organization  
Science 3, 419.   
50 J. Cocco, and P. Volpin, ‘Corporate Governance of Pension Plans: the U.K. evidence’ (2007) 63 
Financial Analysts Journal 1, 70.  
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(USS). 51  Lindenberg and Steg also distinguish between altruistic, biospheric (i.e. 
environmental and societal) values and egotistic values, which can influence pro-social 
behaviour within organisation.52     An important conclusion 
of Hendry, et al. is that institutional investors see themselves not as active ‘owners’, 
but primarily as financial ‘traders’ who happen to control key resources as a result of 
their trading and whose interests are divorced from those of long-term share 
ownership. 53  Similarly, Bengtsson draws links between institutional values and 
investment behaviour by highlighting that the involvement of institutional investors in 
corporate governance is not only influenced by law and regulation, but also by moral 
and societal obligations, as well as relational ties, which seem to be attached to the 
overall ‘ethos’ or a purpose of an organisation.54  More recently, Ormiston, et. al. 
suggest that investor’s expectations regarding risk, return and impact vary according to 
their organisational intentions, noting that ‘financial first’ investors tend to include 
banks, pension funds, wealth funds and finance institutions that seek market-
                                                 
51 R. Aguilera, C. Williams, J. Conley, and D. Rupp, ‘Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility:  
a comparative analysis of the UK and the US’ (2006) 14 Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 3, 147.  
52 S. Lindenberg and L. Steg, ‘Normative, gain and hedonic goal frames guiding environmental 
behaviour’ (2007) 63 Journal of Social Issues 117.  
53 J. Hendry, P. Sanderson, R. Barker, and J. Roberts ‘Responsible Ownership, Shareholder Value and 
the New Shareholder Activism’ (2007) 11 Competition and Change 3, 223.  
54 E. Bengtsson, ‘Organizational approaches to corporate governance: an empirical study on 
shareholder activism’ (2007) 3 International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 3, 238.  
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competitive financial returns on their investments.55 Organisational ethos can be 
defined as –‘the distinguishing character, sentiment, moral nature or guiding beliefs of 
a person, group or institution’56. Ethos may represent organisational values such as 
sustainability, growth or customer focus, which can, in turn, either fit or clash with 
wider values associated with, for example, the political beliefs or personal values of the 
people who work outside and inside organisation, be it executives, board directors, 
academics, or the policy-makers within the wider arena that an organisation operates 
in. The values of stakeholders (for example, current and future retirees of pension fund 
and the owners, employees and sponsors) can influence the values and ethos of the 
pension fund through governance.57       
    In the UK pension funds, organisational ethos is 
associated with the overall purpose to provide retirement benefits to its members at 
costs acceptable to the employer58. Trustees’ duties in relation to the fund are to act 
prudently, honestly and in the best interest of the members.59 However, the literature 
                                                 
55 J. Ormiston, K. Charlton, S. Donald, and R. Seymour, ‘Overcoming the Challenges of Impact 
Investing: Insights from Leading Investors’ (2015) 6 Journal of Social Entrepreneurship 3, 352.   
56 Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 1994.   
57 R. Sievänen, R. Hannu, and B. Scholters, ‘European Pension Funds and Sustainable Development:  
Trade-Offs between Finance and Responsibility’ (2017) 26 Business Strategy and the Environment 914.  
58 It should be noted that this is not a “one size fits” all situation as some large pension funds have 
“professional”/corporate trustees while other smaller DB funds have worker/employee trustees who 
clearly have less awareness of the role and responsibilities of the trustee. 
59 The Pensions Regulator (2010). The Trustee Toolkit, available at: 
http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/trustees.aspx  [last visited 15 Aprl 2018].   
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about engaged and disengaged behaviour of pensions funds suggests that some pension 
fund trustees may understand differently what is the ultimate purpose of the trust and 
that may shape their subsequent approach to stewardship and engagement with 
portfolio firms. For example, in a most recent quantitative study into European Pension 
funds trade-offs between finance and responsibility Siavänen, et. al. find that there is a 
difference in organisational values that pension funds exhibit.60  The authors relate 
altruistic values to the pension fund responsibility which means that a pension fund 
considers ESG issues as well as good governance practices. In contrast, an appreciation 
of financial performance is related to egotistic values.    
   In the context of the UK, Tilba and Wilson provide evidence to 
suggest that engagement or disengagement of pension funds may be a product of trustee 
rhetoric, often constructed in unnoticed ways through the choice of internal and 
external, often irrational, explanations and justifications of their behaviour.61 What 
remains unclear is what organisational ethos is associated with pension funds’ approach 
to engaging with corporations. Questions about the nature of the pensions’ trustee’s 
duties and obligations come to the fore. 
PENSION FUNDS AND FIDUCIARY DUTY 
                                                 
60 Sievänen, R., Hannu, R. and Scholters. B. (2017). European Pension Funds and Sustainable 
Development: Trade-Offs between Finance and Responsibility. Business Strategy and the Environment, 
26, 922.  
61 Tilba. A. and Wilson, J.F. (2017). Vocabularies of Motive and Temporal Perspectives: Examples of 
Pension Fund Engagement and Disengagement.  British Journal of Management, 28(3), 12-13.  
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Pension fund trustees owe certain legal duties to their members, which is 
currently interpreted as a greater stewardship role towards the firms in which they are 
invested62. However, is it unclear if this normative prescription holds any promise for 
a change in investment behaviour towards stewardship because as a concept ‘fiduciary 
duty’ is highly flexible, loose and uncertain. Sandberg suggests that it seems to be 
understood and enacted by practitioners in a variety of ways. 63  The uncertainty 
associated with fiduciary duty is also evident form the on-going reviews of the roles of 
financial intermediaries in relation to ESG meaning only below for the first time issues 
conducted by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 64  the United Nations Environment 
                                                 
62 The Kay Review (2012). The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making. 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/k/12-631-kay-review-of-equity-markets-
interim-report.pdf  65. [last visited 15 April 2018]. 
63 Sandberg, J. (2013). (Re-)Interpreting Fiduciary Duty to Justify Socially Responsible Investment for 
Pension Funds. Corporate Governance: An International Review 21(5), 436.   
64 Known as the Freshfields Report, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer A legal Framework for the 
Integration of Environmental, Social and Governance Issues into Institutional Investment. Report 
produced for UNEP FI (2005) available at: http://uksif.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/FRESHFIELDSBRUCKHAUS-DERINGER-2005.-A-legal-framework-for-
the-integration-of-the-EnvironmentalSocial-and-Governance-issues-into-institutional-investment-
UKSIF-Summa.pdf [last visited 15 April 2018].   
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Programme Finance Initiative,65 and the Law Commission.66 There is a case to be made 
that the explanation of differences in approach to equity ownership, stewardship and 
engagement lies in the different meanings and interpretations that pension fund trustees 
assign to their fiduciary duties.   
The best starting point in explaining these duties is to look at pension legislation 
and the trust deed. Firstly, it is important to note that the verb ‘fiduciary’ means ‘to 
trust’.67 Indeed, UK pension funds originate from a trust tradition which dates back over 
800 years. Under trust law pension fund trustees are required to   manage the assets for 
the beneficiaries of the trust who could not adequately do so themselves68. In other 
words, the trust is designed to protect ‘the interests of the vulnerable’, with others 
                                                 
65  UNEP FI, 2009, UNEP Finance Initiative Innovative Financing for Sustainability available at 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/unepfi_overview_2009.pdf [last visited 15 April 2018].  
66 The Law Commission (2013) Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: Initial Questions at: 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/fiduciary-duties-of-investment-intermediaries/ [last visited, 7 April 
2018].   
67 Sandberg, J. (2013). (Re-)Interpreting Fiduciary Duty to Justify Socially Responsible Investment for 
Pension Funds. Corporate Governance: An International Review 21(5), 437.  
68We note here, that one can argue that some beneficiaries have more financial acumen than the trustees.  
Trust law doesn’t really address the disparity (if it exists) between the superior knowledge of the trustees 
and the relatively vulnerable beneficiaries although this may, in fact, be the case. We keep this in mind 
when ascribing this principle to protecting “the interests of the vulnerable”. 
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having discretionary power to act on their behalf.69 Thus, fiduciary duty requires ‘the 
duty of loyalty’ and ‘the duty of care’, with trustees given a central role in ensuring their 
observance.70   
The Duty of Loyalty  
The duty of loyalty is at the core of fiduciary responsibilities, based on the assumption 
that trustees must act in the sole best interests of beneficiaries. This means acting in 
good faith, avoiding conflicts of interest and not deriving personal profit from the 
exercise of fiduciary responsibilities.71 However, it is unclear what these ‘best interests’ 
are or should be for pension funds,72 as opposed to directors of a company who, it is 
clear, should exercise their powers ‘bona fide in what they consider – not what a court 
may consider – is in the best interests of the company,73 and not for any collateral 
                                                 
69 The Law Commission (2013) Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: Initial Questions at: 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/fiduciary-duties-of-investment-intermediaries/  [last visited, 7 April 
2018], 5-6.  
70 Ibid, page 5-6.  
71 Fair Pensions, (2011)  The Enlightened Shareholder - Clarifying Investors’ Fiduciary Duties 
available at: https://shareaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/EnlightenedShareholderReport.pdf  
[last visited 15 April 2018].  
72 The Law Commission, (2013), Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: Initial Questions at: 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/fiduciary-duties-of-investment-intermediaries/  [last visited, 7 April 
2018] 15.  
73 The ‘company’ in this context is not usually construed as meaning the company as a detached legal 
entity and the courts look for some humans by which to gauge it. Thus in Gaiman v Association for  
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purpose.’74 Similarly, in Dorchester Finance v Stebbing,75 Foster J stated: ‘A director 
must exercise any power vested in him as such, honestly, in good faith and in the 
interests of the company’. In the case of a pension scheme, the task seems not to be 
straightforward: trustees must use their investment powers to earn returns to provide a 
pension. This is best demonstrated by quoting The Pensions Regulator, which states 
that trustees must ensure that pension fund investments deliver value for money and 
good investment outcomes. Accordingly, the interpretation of ‘best interests’ often 
assumes investing in the best financial interests of members.76 The focus on ‘financial’ 
best interest suggests that such interpretations of the fiduciary duty may preclude 
                                                 
Mental Health [1971] Ch 317, 330 Megarry J said, ‘I would accept the interests of both present and 
future members of the company as a whole, as being a helpful expression of a human equivalent. See 
now the duty to promote the success of the company enshrined in section 172 of the Companies Act, 
2006.   
74 [1942] Ch 304, 306.  
75 [1989] BCLC 498.  
76 Sandberg, (2013) above n 17, 437. Furthermore in a recent tweet, Alastair Hudson highlights that:  
‘The starting point is the duty of trustees to exercise their powers in the best interests of the present and 
future beneficiaries of the trust. The duty of the trustees towards their beneficiaries is paramount’. 
Megarry J, Cowan v Scargill, a case on a pension fund the best interests of the beneficiaries are 
normally their best financial interests”. In financial regulation, “best interests” is a positive duty on 
professionals: they must achieve them. The best financial interests of USS members are a Defined  
Benefit scheme.  This principle is the legal sun around which all other pensions law moons revolve. The 
trustee must look to the best interests of the members. That does not entitle them to prioritise 
employers’ wishes over members’ best interests’(@ProfAlastair, 7 April 2018).  
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trustees from considering long-term and non-financial factors, a conclusion that 
demands an empirical investigation77 .   
The Duty of Care   
Although fiduciary duty is legally a different concept from the ‘duty of care78’, in 
fulfilling fiduciary duty , UK pension fund trustees are required to act prudently, 
                                                 
77 B. Richardson, ‘From Fiduciary Duties to Fiduciary Relationships for Socially Responsible  
Investing: Responding to the Will of Beneficiaries’ (2011) 1 Journal of Sustainable Finance and  
Investment 1, 5; Sandberg, (2013), above n 17, 444-445; The Law Commission, above n 62, 5   
78 Fiduciary duty is legally a different concept to a “duty of care”. Article 1 of the Trustee Act 2000 
provides:  The duty of care. 
(1)Whenever the duty under this subsection applies to a trustee, he must exercise such care and skill as 
is reasonable in the circumstances, having regard in particular—(a)to any special knowledge or 
experience that he has or holds himself out as having, and (b)if he acts as trustee in the course of a 
business or profession, to any special knowledge or experience that it is reasonable to expect of a person 
acting in the course of that kind of business or profession. 
(2)In this Act the duty under subsection (1) is called “the duty of care”. 
Schedule 1 of the Act sets out the basis on which this “duty of care” applies to trustees:  
SCHEDULE 1 
Application of duty of care 
Investment 
1The duty of care applies to a trustee— 
(a)when exercising the general power of investment or any other power of investment, however 
conferred; (b)when carrying out a duty to which he is subject under section 4 or 5 (duties relating to the 
exercise of a power of investment or to the review of investments). 
Agents, nominees and custodians 
3(1)The duty of care applies to a trustee—(a)when entering into arrangements under which a person is 
authorised under section 11 to exercise functions as an agent;(b)when entering into arrangements under 
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namely, to exercise the care, diligence and skill that a prudent person of business would 
exercise in managing his or her own affairs.  This is sometimes referred to as the 
‘prudent man rule’79, which typically implies that trustees should seek advice when 
they make investment decisions if they are not investment experts80 . In short, the duty 
of care guards against carelessness and incompetence81  . The concept of care and 
‘prudence’ came to be interpreted in terms of having a sensible investment strategy for 
                                                 
which a person is appointed under section 16 to act as a nominee;(c)when entering into arrangements 
under which a person is appointed under section 17 or 18 to act as a custodian; (d)when entering into 
arrangements under which, under any other power, however conferred, a person is authorised to exercise 
functions as an agent or is appointed to act as a nominee or custodian; (e)when carrying out his duties 
under section 22 (review of agent, nominee or custodian, etc.). 
(2)For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), entering into arrangements under which a person is authorised 
to exercise functions or is appointed to act as a nominee or custodian includes, in particular—(a) selecting 
the person who is to act,(b)determining any terms on which he is to act, and (c)if the person is being 
authorised to exercise asset management functions, the preparation of a policy statement under section 
15. 
79 The Law Commission, (2013), Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: Initial Questions at: 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/fiduciary-duties-of-investment-intermediaries/ (last visited, 7 April 
2018), 53.   
80 Sandberg, J. (2013). (Re-)Interpreting Fiduciary Duty to Justify Socially Responsible Investment for 
Pension Funds. Corporate Governance: An International Review 21(5), 438. 
81 The Law Commission, (2013), Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: Initial Questions at: 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/fiduciary-duties-of-investment-intermediaries/  (last visited, 7 
April 2018), 5 
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the asset portfolio, emphasizing wealth creation through diversification, rather than 
wealth preservation82 .                                                                                                                                                                       
Another interpretation of the duty of care seems to extend beyond the financial 
growth of the fund to encompass wider environmental, societal and governance (ESG) 
issues. This rationale is underpinned by an assumption that if the purpose of a pension 
trust is to provide pensions, then the purpose of a pension fund is to provide a decent 
standard of living for the retired members through considerations of the non-financial 
factors within the investment strategy.83      
 Whether the duty of care is compatible with purposefully taking into account 
ESG issues has been the subject of intense debate, particularly in the context of some 
high-profile and large institutional investors such as the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS) and the New York Teachers Retirement System in the 
US, as well as the Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS) in the UK. These bodies 
are taking a lead role in the Socially Responsible Investment and corporate engagement 
movement, on the basis that these activities are compatible with their fiduciary duty as 
                                                 
82 Fair Pensions, (2011), The Enlightened Shareholder - Clarifying Investors’ Fiduciary Duties 
[available at: 
http://shareaction.org/sites/default/files/uploaded_files/policy/EnlightenedFiduciaryReport.pdf], 18 
[last visited 17 April 218].  
83 Fair Pensions, (2011), The Enlightened Shareholder - Clarifying Investors’ Fiduciary Duties 
http://shareaction.org/sites/default/files/uploaded_files/policy/EnlightenedFiduciaryReport.pdf  13 [last 
visited 7 April 2018]..  
 29  
  
trustees84. What remains unclear, however, is whether any of these suggestions are 
plausible for other pension funds. Theoretically and practically we are thus left with a 
question of what is the nature of fiduciary obligation, how it is understood and 
discharged in practice; and what do these observations suggest about the nature and a 
purpose of a pension fund.85  
Using the data collected as part of a bigger study86 into pension fund investment 
practices the following section elaborates on the empirical findings from 35 in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews with pension fund trustee, executives, investment 
intermediaries and a series of round table discussions with pensions experts.  These 
initial 35 interviews with pension fund trustees, executives, investment intermediaries 
were complemented by a series of meetings and round-table discussions which took 
place in London as part of the Law Commission Consultation on Fiduciary Duties of 
Investment Intermediaries to which one of the authors 87  has contributed. The 
discussions with pensions, legal, investment and policy experts, aimed at establishing 
which factors pension fund trustees consider, or should consider, when investing assets 
                                                 
84 Sandberg, J. (2011). Socially Responsible Investment and Fiduciary Duty: Putting the Freshfields 
Report into Perspective. Journal of Business Ethics 101, 143-162. 
85 The Law Commission, (2013), Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: Initial Questions at: 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/fiduciary-duties-of-investment-intermediaries/  [last visited, 7 April 
2018], 1.  
86  Tilba, A. (2011). Pension Fund’s Investment Practice and Corporate Engagement. PhD Thesis, 
University of Liverpool Management School, 126; Tilba, A. and McNulty, T. (2013) ‘Engaged versus 
Disengaged Ownership. The Case of Pension Funds in the UK’ Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 21(2): 165-182.  
87 Tilba, A. shared her expertise in pension fund governance, investment management and corporate 
engagement as a member of the Law Commission Advisory Board for the Consultation and the Final 
Report on Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries (2013/2014). The Law Commission Final 
Report. No. 307 https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/fiduciary-duties-of-investment-intermediaries/ 
[last visited 17 April 2018]. 
 30  
  
on behalf of members. In particular, it was vital to inquire whether they should take 
into account corporate governance or stewardship issues, and how far trustees take 
those issues on board. The discussions resulted in further analysis of the interview data 
for a fine-grained understanding of the interview content, particularly relating to the 
concept of pension fund ‘trust’ and trustee ‘fiduciary duties’ in relation to investment 
and stewardship.     
PLURALITY OF FIDUCIARY DUTY INTERPRETATIONS   
One of the key observations this study makes is that pension fund trustees interpret 
their fiduciary duties in a variety of ways. With particular reference to engagement, it 
is possible to draw parallels between their interpretations of fiduciary duties and 
engagement and ultimately how trustees understand the purpose of their pension fund.  
The findings suggest that approaches to equity ownership and stewardship are largely 
informed by trustees’ interpretations of fiduciary duty, resulting in the following 
observations.    
Firstly, pension funds can be seen as positioned along an analytical spectrum of 
engagement, where some pension fund trustees seek to exert more influence than others 
over investee companies. A predominantly Disengaged approach to equity ownership 
is positioned at the extreme minimalistic end of the spectrum and it is associated with 
pension fund trustees seeing the purpose of the fund is just to pay pensions and trustees 
fiduciary duty of loyalty is therefore to act in the best financial interests of the pension 
fund’s members, which has nothing to do with the Stewardship Code assumptions. This 
approach is contrasted with Corporate Engagement at the other extreme of the spectrum. 
Trustees of more engaged pension funds usually interpret their obligations and the 
purpose of a pension fund in more broad terms, i.e. being more active in corporate 
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governance as stewards of invested shares. Trustees within this group interpret their 
duties as extending to broader environmental, social and corporate governance issues.  
In between the two extreme forms in the model are Corporate Employer Engagement 
and Fund Manager Engagement.   
Within Corporate Employer Engagement, the duty of loyalty is broadly 
interpreted to mean acting in the best financial interests, but also meaning that the duty 
of care extends to considering the economic well-being of their sponsoring company, 
prompting engagement in the governance of their employer rather than investment 
portfolio companies. In the case of Fund Manager Engagement, trustees see it as their 
duty to maximize the investment returns, but also engage with fund managers in order 
to improve corporate governance of their investment portfolio for the financial benefit 
of pension fund members. It appears that the most meaningful strategic engagement is 
rare and frequently happens ‘behind closed doors’, resulting in the creation of few 
records.  
Finally, positioning the data along the analytical spectrum of engagement suggests 
that most pension funds are disengaged, focusing on maximizing their investment 
returns. In this form, pension funds trustees do not have direct contact with investee 
companies, having delegated all to do with investment management and corporate 
engagement to investment managers.   
These main findings help develop the analytical spectrum of pension fund 
engagement presented in Figure 1, which links different interpretations of fiduciary 
duties to forms and methods of engagement. This Figure can be used as a guide and a 
reference point to present and explain the findings, starting first with the majority of 
distant disengaged pension funds.  
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Figure 1 Stewardship, Fiduciary Duties and the Spectrum of Engagement   
______________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here  
_______________________________  
  
Disengagement   
The overall pattern of pension fund behaviour towards equity investment is Disengaged. 
Positioned at the very minimalistic end of the spectrum, this form of equity ownership 
assumes that pension fund trustees delegate88 everything linked to associated equity 
management to their external investment fund managers and focus fund manager 
mandates on investment performance. Out of thirty-five interviews undertaken for this 
study, twenty-two interviews suggest that the majority of pension funds do not have 
direct relationships with their investee companies, nor do they seek to influence their 
fund managers in any way when it comes to corporate governance or ESG issues.   
Although pension fund trustees associated with this form of engagement 
consider corporate governance ‘on paper’, a director of a pension fund with nearly £4 
billion of assets under management notes that there is ‘blind delegation’ of these  
responsibilities to external investment fund managers. Moreover, there appears to be 
very limited monitoring and no clear prescription about what engagement policy should 
look like and how it should be effectively communicated to fund managers. In practice, 
                                                 
88 Most UK pension funds use a delegated model of investment management. It should be noted here that 
it doesn’t mean that only this explains their disengagement. However, we notice that more engaged funds 
have more in-house investment expertise so they would have a hybrid investment management model.   
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involvement either with the investee companies or with fund managers on the issues of 
corporate governance is minimal. The following statement of a current investment fund 
manager (also former pension fund CEO) reflects the lack of trustee interest in corporate 
governance and engagement:    
‘a lot of trustees are still probably paying lip service to the voting 
process and the governance process… a lot of our clients are like 
that…I have been to lots of pension fund trustee meetings and in nine 
out of ten of them trustees never ask questions about corporate 
governance. They are interested in our investment performance and 
they want to know what we are doing, what our strategy is, how we 
are allocating money, do we think the market is coming up or down’.  
 
Under their operating mandate, fund managers are responsible for equity management 
and all that is related to corporate governance, mostly understood by pension fund 
interviewees as doing due diligence, research and monitoring, selecting appropriate 
shares if publication is in the UK and voting at company meetings. In this arrangement, 
the fund managers have the flexibility to decide what shares to buy and sell, how and 
when to vote and what methods of engagement are necessary. Engagement at this end 
of the spectrum is largely retrospective and relates to fund managers reporting on how 
they voted. The focus of the investment report relates to performance, namely, how the 
agreed investment benchmarks are met or outperformed. All interviews with pension 
funds in this cluster indicate that the fund manager mandate is oriented overwhelmingly 
to generating returns on investments. When the investment performance is poor, or 
when corporate governance concerns arise, fund managers are encouraged to exercise 
discipline over corporate management by selling or trading the shares (exiting), rather 
than engaging in corporate governance (expressing voice). In short, trustees were more 
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concerned with the delivery of investment performance, rather than the drivers of that 
performance through stewardship and engagement.   
Significantly, this approach to equity ownership is informed by trustees’ 
understanding of the purpose of the trust and what the trustees’ duties are in relation to 
that trust. Trustees and fund executives consider that pension funds are there to provide 
financial security to members. A trustee’s duty in relation to the trust is to ensure that 
pension fund assets are invested in a way to secure the financial interests of pension 
fund members. As a trustee of a pension fund with assets under management around 
£2.3 billion explains:   
‘We’ve always taken a view that we’ve got fiduciary duty, which 
is to get the appropriate level of return to meet our liabilities 
going forward, so we don’t take account all those ESG issues, we 
don’t screen on that basis’   
The core duty of loyalty to act in the best interests of pension fund members is broadly 
understood by trustees as acting in the best financial interests, namely, the trustee’s role 
in relation to the trust is to deliver and pay benefits when they fall due to the members 
of the scheme. These interpretations are evident from a majority of trustee statements 
about their role and duties:    
‘Coming back to basics, a trustee has got to act in the members’ best 
interest – that’s just a principal trust law and that’s extended in the 
pension’s law context to say that trustees have got to act in the 
members best financial interest… you’ve got to promise that the 
person will get his final salary on his retirement and that there is 
enough money there, because you promised to pay it’.   
‘We feel as trustees to have a duty to look after the interests of our 
members… and we generally try to do that by maximizing the returns 
relative to the risks that we take’.    
 35  
  
Although a trustee’s duty gives the trustees a fair amount of discretion in making 
investment decisions, provided they do it in good faith and take on appropriate 
investment advice, the common perception is that engagement is simply not something 
that trustees are supposed to be doing89. Trustees were more interested in the sound 
standards of administration and other, more generic issues, such as ‘being fully funded 
as soon as possible’ and ‘getting their bloody pension.’90  
Furthermore, spending money on engagement was also considered to be an 
‘unjustified’ use of pension fund resources because of the perceived lack of evidence 
about the ‘immediate benefits’ of engagement. A CEO of an industry-wide pension fund 
with assets under management of £3.4 billion echoes the above statements by 
questioning the benefits of engagement:    
‘We can’t necessarily demonstrate that [engagement] cost would 
lead to a better financial return for our members, so there is a 
conflict because the trustees’ primary role is to look after the best 
                                                 
89 See s 1 of the Trustee Act 2000 and Schedule 1 thereof. 
90 See section 3 of the Trustee Act :3 General power of investment. 
(1)Subject to the provisions of this Part, a trustee may make any kind of investment that he could make 
if he were absolutely entitled to the assets of the trust. 
(2)In this Act the power under subsection (1) is called “the general power of investment”. 
(3)The general power of investment does not permit a trustee to make investments in land other than in 
loans secured on land (but see also section 8). 
(4)A person invests in a loan secured on land if he has rights under any contract under which— 
(a)one person provides another with credit, and 
(b)the obligation of the borrower to repay is secured on land. 
(5) “Credit” includes any cash loan or other financial accommodation. 
(6) “Cash” includes money in any form. 
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financial interests of members. How can we demonstrate that our 
engagement with this company has actually led to a greater financial 
return? Trustees can’t do that, it is very difficult, they are open to 
challenge by members and can be successfully sued through the 
courts for not looking after the members best financial interests’.    
It was consequently apparent from many conversations with trustees that 
engagement was not considered to be a prudent way of fulfilling a trustee’s duty of care 
sensibly to grow a pension fund. Interestingly, all trustees within this sample considered 
that they are not qualified, or not the ‘right people’, to engage with the investee 
companies, because the responsibility over investment choices and particular styles of 
management fall within the remit of an external investment fund manager. All 
interviewees considered their investment fund managers to be better suited to conduct 
engagement tasks because the fund managers ‘are the ones whose  
performance depends on those stocks doing well, who research these companies and 
have an in-depth understanding of the business and when intervention is necessary’. 
Therefore, delegation91 is not only a ‘practical issue’, but also a way of avoiding 
putting liability associated with running the investment on trust. As one trustee 
explains:   
‘we are all the time cognisant of the fact that we can’t do too much 
influencing our investment managers because if we do that [A] they 
can’t fulfil their brief, and [B] are we actually starting to take 
responsibility and therefore liability back into the trustee.’   
While reflecting on the role of trustees, several respondents have referred to the 
Pensions Act, which requires them to delegate all day-to-day investment decisions to 
                                                 
91  See comment on authorisation - PERG 10.3 Pension Scheme Trustees 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/PERG/10/3.html [accessed 30 October 2018].  
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their fund managers92. This also includes any stewardship and engagement activities 
that the fund manager might carry out on behalf of trustees. This, however, is preceded 
by making returns on investment above all within the investment mandate.   
Employer Engagement  
   
Employer Engagement is a peculiar form of engagement because it assumes that 
pension funds can be both distant and involved in corporate governance. On the one 
hand, pension funds have very little interest in how their portfolio companies are 
governed, delegating investment management to external fund managers. At the same 
time, these schemes pay significant attention to governance of their own corporate 
sponsor.   
The relationship with the sponsoring organisation became increasingly 
important as pension fund liabilities are now shown on the employer’s balance sheets.  
The relationship between a pension fund and its employer is important, so much so that 
within one interview 43.3% of the entire content related to the corporate sponsor’s role 
in pension fund investment strategy. Other interviewees have also indicated that the 
issues of governance of the corporate sponsor and its compliance with the codes of best 
practice are important to trustees. In this form of engagement, a lot of corporate 
governance discussions between trustees and the senior managers are routine, taking 
place ‘behind the scenes’, involving dialogue about the overall strategic direction of the 
                                                 
92  The Pensions Regulator summarises these obligations as Duties and Powers 
[http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/trustees/role-trustee.aspx See also 
http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/2-clear-roles.aspx [last visited 10 April 2018].  
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company, rather than structural governance issues such as remuneration or the board 
structure.   
Involvement with an employer means working towards a better and more 
financially secure future for the company. In turn, this means fulfilling fiduciary duty 
requirements by ensuring a strong and steady flow of pension contributions, which is 
in the interests of the pension fund members and the fund. In other words, engaging 
with the corporate sponsor is seen as part of a trustees’ duty of care to secure employer’s 
contributions, and in so doing to grow the fund. Disengagement with portfolio 
companies appears to be the enactment of the duty of loyalty to protect the financial 
interests of the fund members by focusing on investment performance of the investment 
managers, rather than the individual investee firms. As a trustee of one industry-wide 
pension fund with assets under management exceeding £22 billion explains:   
‘As a trustee, one of my first and foremost duties is to ensure that 
there are adequate funds to pay the benefits to the members for as 
long as the benefits are due to be paid. In order to achieve that you 
have to look at the strength of the sponsor of the company. One of 
the huge influences on the strength of our sponsor is the fact that 
we’ve got this guarantee of continuing business for the next 25 
years.’   
Interviewees explain that the reputation and the strength of the corporate sponsor, or  
‘employer’s covenant’, is key, particularly when it comes to weighing up the value of 
the pension promise that the employer has made to its members. A Chair of Trustees 
for a pension fund with assets under management exceeding £13 billion explains that 
she considers that her fiduciary duty is not only protecting the interests of the existing 
beneficiaries, but also caring for the scheme’s future beneficiaries ‘by keeping the 
scheme going forward, keeping it open for the new members and looking after 
tomorrow’s members’ interests’, specifically by making sure that the employer remains 
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strong. A CEO of a UK top ten pension fund with assets under management of over £13 
billion explains:   
‘We take our own corporate governance very seriously, the 
independence of the board, the process, the quality are very 
important...understanding the dynamics with the company 
…because it is interdependent, which is the magic glue in the pension 
fund system between the sponsor and the trustees.’  
She goes on to say that:   
‘Our biggest exposure is the corporate and whatever we do in any particular 
position, it would never have as much influence as us spending time with our 
corporate, making sure that we are getting the right flow of money and things 
are working right. It is a sensible use of time. The trustees have limited time, 
so you put your effort and time into things that make the biggest difference 
and for lots of pension schemes that are attached to the corporate, 
particularly in these difficult times, their attention is fundamentally going to 
be driven by that…. And fundamentally we still have got the financial job to 
do here, that’s what the fiduciary responsibility is primarily, so you could not 
just give into something that you think is a really good cause – that’s charity’.   
Engagement with the employer ranged from trustees making ‘petitions’ in  
corridors, discussing corporate governance issues with the management at the trustee 
board meetings, persuading managers to report on their corporate actions, having 
telephone conversations with senior managers over issues such as dividend pay-outs, 
senior executive appointments, remuneration, strategy and investments, share price 
fluctuation, and climate change and other CSR issues. In other words, trustees were 
making sure that the senior managers were running the company ‘in a proper manner 
and through the right processes that are being monitored’. Indeed, in one case a pension 
fund was actually sitting in an employer’s corporate governance department, which also 
included a legal team and senior remuneration team. In some cases trustees were even 
signing confidentiality agreements with the corporation not to disclose the entrusted 
information. Engagement was certainly not happening ‘via the press’. Interestingly, 
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interview questions explicitly about trustees influencing and engaging with investee 
companies often caused confusion because the interviewees did not see it as their duty 
to engage, so the answers were quite sceptical and often ironical:   
‘A lot of things from the FSA (now, the FCA) or from the government 
implying that pension funds, as owners of assets, should be doing 
more and you should be influencing banks to be better in terms of 
managing risks. Really? Is that what we are there to do? It’s not! I 
don’t think it is what we are there to do. The regulator cannot expect 
a group of trustees who are doing their best to run a pension fund to 
have better knowledge than them.’   
Just as with disengaged funds, the majority of respondents within this form considered 
themselves as not being in a position to influence ‘other’ companies because the 
shareholdings in individual companies were small and represented only a ‘vehicle for 
delivering revenues’ needed to pay out pensions to members. Interviewees indicate that 
although they have a ‘shareholder activism policy’ within their Statement of Investment 
Principles, it is mostly to ‘tick a box’ as they fully delegate to their investment fund 
managers and ‘almost never’ ask any questions.   
Fund Manager Engagement   
In the case of pension funds, this form of engagement relates not to pension funds’ 
activity vis-à-vis investee corporations directly, but pension funds engaging ‘one level 
down’ - at the fund manager level. Here, pension fund trustees can put pressure on their 
fund managers (through the mandate) to engage with the investee companies on a 
pension fund’s behalf.  
While a fund manager is expected to produce returns on investment, the manager 
is also expected to exercise share ownership rights by voting, using either pension fund 
guidelines or guidelines from other industry organizations, primarily the Pension 
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Investment Research Consultants (PIRC) 93  or the Pension and Lifetime Savings 
Association (PLSA)94 95. As shown in Figure 1, predominantly local authority pension 
funds are associated with this form of engagement, with eight local authorities and three 
occupational pension fund interviews revealing that local authority pension funds exert 
more pressure on their fund managers because they themselves are under public scrutiny 
and demand for greater transparency, particularly when it comes to disclosing voting 
policies.  
The intensity of engagement with investment fund managers ranges from simply 
specifying voting guidelines to actively researching fund managers before appointment. 
Significant attention is spent on researching a fund manager’s voting policies and 
corporate governance activities. The fund managers are encouraged to engage with the 
companies on behalf of pension funds on corporate governance issues such as: board 
structure; director independence; combined roles of CEO and Chairman, remuneration, 
senior appointments, and mergers. In short, it is primarily about due diligence.    
Pension fund engagement with the investment fund managers is largely 
informed by how trustees and pensions’ executives interpret their roles and duties. 
Despite the delegated nature of investment management, interviewees within this 
category share a common understanding that their duty in relation to the trust also 
includes stewardship of investee companies. Interviews indicate that in the eyes of 
trustees, pension funds as institutional investors should not only focus on paying out 
                                                 
93 http://pirc.co.uk/news-and-resources2/guidelines [last visited 10 April 2018].  
94 https://www.plsa.co.uk/Policy-and-Research-Stewardship [last visited 17 April 2018].  
95 PLSA Corporate Governance Policy and Voting Guidelines  2018 
25 January 2018 
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pensions, but also act as responsible owners of shares by exerting influence over 
investee corporations through their investment fund managers. Trustees value higher 
standards of corporate governance as a way to safeguard against poor performance, 
believing that more responsible ownership would benefit the scheme’s members in the 
long-term. A Chief Investment Officer of an occupational pension fund over £5.1 billion 
highlights that:  
‘[They] see that it is the job of the trustees to influence the managers 
around taking an interest in the companies and voting the shares… 
so we would have engagement at the manager level rather than at 
stock level’.   
Within this form of engagement, respondents interpret their fiduciary duty of loyalty as 
acting in the best financial interest of the pension fund members by guarding against 
corporate governance failures and by pressuring investment managers to engage with 
portfolio firms. The interviewees also see it as the fund manager’s ‘job’ to do so because 
it is the investment manager who is selecting the stocks and running the portfolio on a 
pension fund’s behalf. A trustee from a local authority pension fund (£5 billion) 
explains:  
 ‘Motivation to engage with the managers was to recognise that 
pension funds were investing a great deal of money and shouldn’t be 
complacent about what is going on in the underlying investments. 
Governance does go to value and you know if a company is being 
properly run according to good standards actually that should be in 
our best interests anyway because ultimately it should go to value’.     
   
It is consequently apparent from discussions with trustees about their fiduciary duties 
that by engaging with the investment fund managers, pension fund trustees broadly 
fulfil their duty of loyalty to act in the best financial interests of the pension fund 
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members, but ‘stretching’ those interests to include non-financial interests as a means 
of enhancing the value of pension fund investment and the value of a pension fund.   
Corporate Engagement  
Within this study, only two occupational and local authority pension funds represented 
by the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF)96 directly engaged with investee 
companies by conducting company research and monitoring, voting and proxy voting, 
writing letters, and holding face-to-face meetings with senior management and boards 
of directors about structural and strategic corporate governance issues. These pension 
funds also invested in specialist corporate governance teams in-house or worked with 
external industry bodies such as PIRC, RImetrics or NAPF. In discussing governance 
issues with senior managers, pension fund respondents gave preference to the more 
subtle and routine conversations ‘behind the scenes’ and ‘trying to create and maintain 
long-term relationships with the companies’.   
There is a difference between occupational and local authority pension funds as 
regards their preference for direct engagement methods. A small number of extremely 
large pension funds use routine negotiation and occasional outbursts of public 
engagement ‘to make the point’. Local authority pension funds appear to be focusing 
their engagement efforts at direct management control through collaborative 
shareholder resolutions via the LAPFF. For example, at the time of data collection, the 
LAPFF sent 374 letters to investee companies expressing corporate governance 
concerns, as well as engaging with 316 companies on the issues ranging from executive 
                                                 
96 LAPFF is a voluntary association of 48 UK public sector pension schemes that collectively promote 
the investment interests of local authority pension funds and maximize their influence as shareholders 
in promoting high standards of corporate governance and social responsibility 
[http://www.lapfforum.org/ last visited 17 April 2018].    
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remuneration to climate change. Engagement at this level is possible because through 
LAPFF or NAPF these funds have tens of billions of pounds of assets under 
management and vast internal resources. Collectively, these funds invested over £90 
billion in UK equities, and in some cases the share-ownership stakes were quite 
substantial, providing access and enabling these funds directly to voice corporate 
governance concerns. Not surprisingly, these funds are atypical in the UK pension fund 
landscape.  
Significantly, the respondents within this group of funds believe that stewardship 
and engagement ‘makes sense’ for two distinct reasons. One underlying motivation 
behind engagement relates to trustees interpreting their fiduciary duty as securing the 
best financial interests of the members where engagement adds value and produces 
better financial returns for the pension fund.  The other relates to trustees’ personal 
values and a sense of altruism and responsibility, which is associated with the duty of 
care. This assumes being a responsible owner of shares, providing not only capital but 
also being concerned with environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues for the 
greater good of society. A more altruistic stance towards engagement is more evident 
in the local authority pension fund context. One of the reasons for such a ‘concentration’ 
of responsible investment interests within the public sector pension funds could be that 
local authorities are more pressured to have higher standards of public accountability 
and more is expected of these funds in terms of a public concern with ESG issues. These 
distinctions are explained in the next section.   
Engagement as a Way to Maximize Investment Returns   
All nine interviewees within this group of pension fund trustees justify their approach 
to engagement by claims that it adds value and produces better investment performance. 
Since better investment performance is in the best financial interests of the members, 
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engagement becomes part of a trustees’ duty of loyalty. For example, an Executive 
Member of LAPFF and a trustee of a pension fund with assets under management of 
over £3 billion highlights that engagement:   
‘…adds value. It is not just altruistic…it is actually good 
business…there is evidence that it does add value to your shares… as 
much as 8% to the company value...It probably adds 20%, which is a 
lot’.    
Notwithstanding the apparent profit-maximising motive, it may be that there are 
other considerations that guide trustees’ decision to be involved in corporate 
governance, namely, trustees’ personal, altruistic values that act in the best long-term 
interests of members, ensuring that the pensions’ benefits could be enjoyed in future.  
These values seem to be arising from the broader interpretation of a trustee’s duty of 
care, which assumes long-term growth of the fund and sustainable pensions for both 
existing and future members.   
Engagement as a Way to Ensure a Sustainable Future    
Only two occupational pension fund trustees advocated this view of equity ownership. 
The more altruistic stance to engagement is more evident within local authority 
pension funds. According to five local authority interviewees, trustees who decide to 
engage with the investee companies are guided by the desire to serve not just 
immediate pension fund members but also for the ‘greater good’ of the public. A 
CEO of one industry-wide pension fund with assets under management of over £3 
billion also notes that there are differences in the drivers of investment strategy 
between local authority and private sector pension funds, where public sector funds 
have a ‘more moral view of things’ running through their investments.  
Another local authority pension fund CEO (£2 billion) expressed a similar opinion:  
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 ‘We are a public sector body. In our day-to-day dealings good 
corporate governance, transparency with the public is key in everything 
we do, so we are applying that rationale to the pension fund… we have 
real high standards of public accountability and we just believe that that 
should run through our investments and if we got a chance through that 
investment to influence – we should be doing it’   
  
Just by virtue of being in the public sector, local authority pension funds appear to stand 
out in their attempts to integrate social responsibility into their investment practice. The 
local authority pension fund trustees ‘feel that they have a duty’ to engage with their 
investee companies due to their political and ideological principles. In this case, 
stewardship and responsible ownership are enactments of duty of care within pension 
funds. In short, engagement ‘makes sense’ and is embedded in the investment 
philosophy and connected to the overall investment decision-making process. It is also 
worth noting here that such interpretations of fiduciary duty were causing tension within 
strategic investment decision-making because as ethical or political views were often 
personal, it was difficult for trustees to justify their choice of issues and embedding that 
within the investment strategy.    
DISCUSSION  
This study contributes to existing governance research in several respects. 
Firstly, it addresses a serious omission in corporate governance research by focusing 
our attention on the governance of significant and distinct types of financial institution 
such as pension funds. Using the lens of investor stewardship, the ultimate goal of this 
paper is to reveal how pension fund trustees interpret the vague concept of ‘fiduciary 
duty’ in their investment practices. More specifically, this paper sheds more light on 
whether trustees’ interpretations of their legal and regulatory duties are, indeed, 
compatible with investor stewardship and engagement, and thus regulators’ 
expectations, particularly in the context of the UK Stewardship Code. The paper also 
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provides more clarity around stewardship considerations and compatibility with current 
legal guidelines, offering views on the prospects and challenges of stewardship and 
engagement.    
Theoretically, the paper answers calls to disambiguate the concept of ‘fiduciary 
duty’97 by developing a multi-layered model which identifies a range of interpretations 
of fiduciary duty and relating them to specific forms and methods of pension fund 
stewardship and corporate engagement. Other scholars and policymakers have 
highlighted this ambiguity but were not able to provide empirically grounded 
explanations for it. 98   Four distinct approaches are revealed within this model: 
Disengagement, Employer Engagement, Fund Manager Engagement and Corporate 
Engagement. This more detailed conceptualisation of pension fund approaches to equity 
ownership underpinned by trustee understanding of their duties allows us to explain 
why some pension funds may seek to exert more influence than others over investee 
companies whilst others remain distant.  
                                                 
97 Sandberg, J. (2011). Socially Responsible Investment and Fiduciary Duty: Putting the Freshfields 
Report into Perspective. Journal of Business Ethics 101, 143-162.  
Sandberg, J. (2013). (Re-)Interpreting Fiduciary Duty to Justify Socially Responsible Investment for 
Pension Funds. Corporate Governance: An International Review 21(5), 436-446. 
98 B. Richardson, ‘From Fiduciary Duties to Fiduciary Relationships for Socially Responsible  
Investing: Responding to the Will of Beneficiaries’ (2011) 1 Journal of Sustainable Finance and  
Investment 1, 5; Sandberg, (2013), above n 17, 444-445; The Law Commission, above n 62, 5; 
Financial Conduct Authority (2018) Discussion paper on the duty of care and potential alternative 
approaches [https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/dp-18-05.pdf]  (last visited on 30 October 
2018). 
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Through the Spectrum of Engagement (Figure 1) it is possible to demonstrate 
how the intensity of engagement may be linked to how trustees sometimes ‘stretch’99 
the meaning of “fiduciary duty” from the very minimalistic idea of acting solely in the 
best financial interests (focusing on generating investment returns) to considering other 
factors such as the welfare of the employer/employee and other environmental, social 
and governance factors. These findings are particularly interesting given that few 
studies have examined everyday practices of pension funds and offered contrasting 
insights into motivations that underpin their behaviour.100   
This study sheds more light into this conflicting evidence on pension fund 
motivations101  and reveals that the predominant motivation of pension fund utility 
maximization stems from trustees’ interpretation of their duty to act in the best financial 
interests of members. This is achieved through maximizing returns on investment and 
focusing the investment fund managers’ mandates solely on generating investment 
                                                 
99 Sandberg, (2013) above n 17, 437.  
100 Tilba, A and McNulty, T. (2013). Engaged versus Disengaged Ownership: The Case of Pension 
Funds in the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review 21(2), 176-177; Tilba. A. and 
Wilson, J.F. (2017). Vocabularies of Motive and Temporal Perspectives: Examples of Pension Fund 
Engagement and Disengagement.  British Journal of Management, 28(3), 11-13.  
101 M. Goranova and L. Ryan, ‘Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary Review’ (2014) 40 Journal 
of Management, 5, p.335; Aguilera, R.V., Williams, C.A., Conley, J.M. and Rupp, D.E. (2006). 
Corporate Governance and Social responsibility: a comparative analysis of the UK and the US. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 14(3), 147-158; Lindenberg S, Steg L. (2007). 
Normative, gain and hedonic goal frames guiding environmental behaviour. Journal of Social Issues 
63, p. 223.   
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performance. Ormiston, et. al. referred to this as financial first focus.102   In this case, 
the interests of a pension fund (principals) are not associated with the interests of the 
investee companies. The findings of this paper echo Sievänen et. al. who have observed 
that European pension funds who have not included stewardship in their investment 
strategy have a clear priority regarding their financial performance.103  
Furthermore, this study lends further support to Davies104  and Hendry, et al.105 
who note that the majority of pension funds are not ‘real’ owners but detached quasi-
owners with highly diversified portfolios. In this instance, the prevailing ideology that 
shareholders ‘own’ the investee company appears to be a misconception.  The finding 
of predominantly disengaged pension funds lends further support to the academic 
scepticism about the effectiveness of the Stewardship Code in practice.106  
                                                 
102 Ormiston, et. al, above n 50, 352.  
103 Sievänen, R. Hannu, and B. Scholters, ‘European Pension Funds and Sustainable Development:  
Trade-Offs between Finance and Responsibility’ (2017) 26 Business Strategy and the Environment 912-
926. 
104 Davies (2015), above n 5, 18.   
105 Hendry, J. Sanderson, P. Barker, R. and Roberts, J. (2006). Owners or Traders? Conceptualizations 
of Institutional Investors and Their Relationship With Corporate Managers. Human Relations 59, 1101-
1132; Hendry, J., Sanderson, P., Barker, R. and Roberts, J. (2007). Responsible Ownership, Shareholder 
Value and the New Shareholder Activism. Competition and Change 11(3), 223-240; 
106 Cheffins, B. R. (2010). The Stewardship Code’s Achilles’ Heel. The Modern Law Review, 73(6), 
985-1025; D. Arsalidou, ‘Institutional Investors, behavioural economics and the concept of Stewardship’ 
(2012) 6 Law and Financial Market Review 6, 410; A Reisberg, 'The UK stewardship code: On the road 
to nowhere?' (2015) 2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 217. 
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Nevertheless, we can also see some evidence of pension fund trustees behaving 
like stewards in relation to shares. In the case of pension funds, the findings suggest that 
stewardship behaviour can be explained by the willingness and ability of trustees to 
‘stretch107’ the meaning of fiduciary duty, from the very minimalistic idea of acting 
solely in the best financial interests by generating investment returns to considering 
other factors such as the welfare of the employer and other environmental, social and 
governance issues. These funds invest similarly to what Siavänen et. al describe as 
altruistic pension funds responsibility,108 which assumes investing also in ESG issues 
as well as good governance practices. This approach is broadly consistent with the 
interim Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) proposals to legislate stewardship 
activities for trustees109 
However, only a few occupational and predominantly local authority pension 
funds in the UK exhibited such an approach to equity ownership, which suggests that 
there may be widespread misconceptions about the nature of the obligations amongst 
pension fund trustees, something which is not helpful in realising the aspirations of 
                                                 
107 It should be noted here that the language of ‘stretching’ is not intended to presuppose the ‘proper’ 
meaning of Fiduciary Duty.  
 
108 Siavänen, et. al. (2017) above n 52, 922.  
109 Department for Work and Pensions Consultation on clarifying and strengthening trustees’ investment 
duties (June 2018) 
[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716
949/consultation-clarifying-and-strengthening-trustees-investment-duties.pdf] [last visited on 30 
October 2018].  
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investor stewardship and engagement. 110  These misconceptions are particularly 
worrying because they may be perpetuated over time within pension fund investment 
practices through embedded organisational discourse, as Tilba and Wilson suggest.111  
Furthermore, if the pension fund does not invest in the employer company, there is 
presumably no duty for any stewardship under the Code, as no shares are held.  
The findings of this paper also have implications for our understanding of 
accountability relationships between pension funds, pension fund trustees and their 
investee corporations. This study finds that the lines of accountability between pension 
fund trustees and their investee companies are loose and confused. This is something 
Hendry, et. al. have observed, but did not explain.112  As an ambiguous and flexible 
concept ‘fiduciary duty’ seems to give trustees a ‘curtain’ behind which to hide when 
stewardship is concerned. In theory, trustees and pension fund executives have the 
discretion to decide what ESG investments or stewardship activities are in the best 
interests of pension fund members. On the other hand, in practice there may always be 
                                                 
110 The Stewardship Code, above n 11; The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term 
Decision Making, available at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/k/12-631-
kayreview-of-equity-markets-interim-report.pdf  [last visited 15 April 2018].   
111    A. Tilba and J. Wilson, ‘Vocabularies of Motive and Temporal Perspectives: Examples of Pension 
Fund Engagement and Disengagement’ (2017) British Journal of Management, 11.  The authors argue 
that pension fund engagement and disengagement may be an example of organisational enactment 
through co-production of organisational narratives, which is a systematic and self-reinforcing processes 
that can provide the dominant patterns of sense-making and reasoning which also can be persistent over 
time. 
112 Hendry, et. al, above n 48, 223.  
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an ‘alternative’ view or solutions to how the same duty can apply. Therefore, it is 
possible for trustees to choose the simplest solution, which is to do nothing and delegate 
engagement to the investment fund managers. This raises questions about the relevance 
of a stewardship perspective as applied to the specific case of pension funds. Jay 
Youngdahl calls this an ‘ethical disconnect’. 113  Theoretically, we thus illuminate 
contemporary manifestations of the Kantian dilemma, namely, how to prevent a 
possible abuse of self-regulation without undermining self-regulation itself. As the 
relational paradigm in contract and trust law is increasingly being eclipsed by the reality 
of intermediary domination in defining investors’ nature of participation and as the 
funds’ corporate governance positions are determined by asset management funds, not 
their savers or their trustees, our findings of the interpretations of the pension fund 
trustee duties become even more significant for the current policy debates.    
POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
This paper highlights significant challenges of using ‘fiduciary duty’ as a tool 
of governance in light of the ongoing governmental reviews of instructional codes of 
best practice. 114  The Stewardship Code and the subsequent 2012 Kay Review 
                                                 
113 J. Youngdahl (2014) ‘The fiduciary duty to protect: the forgotten duty in pension fund investment’. 
Law and Financial Markets Review, 8:3, p. 245.  
114 FRC, (December, 2017) Proposed Revisions to the UK Corporate Governance Code, available at:  
https://frc.org.uk/getattachment/f7366d6f-aa57-4134-a409-1362d220445b/;.aspx [last visited 7 April 
2018].  The Stewardship Code 2012 revision (2018) Financial Reporting Council 
[https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/f7366d6f-aa57-4134-a409-1362d220445b/;.aspx [last visited 7 
April 2018]; Financial Conduct Authority (2018) Discussion Paper on a Duty of Care and potential 
alternative approaches https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/dp-18-05.pdf [last visited 7 April 
2018].  
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highlighted the excessive focus on the short-termist investment strategies in UK equity 
markets, arguing that this is detrimental to sustainable value creation in British 
companies. The Kay Review sought to address this longstanding concern by 
encouraging investor stewardship and recommending that ‘all participants in the equity 
investment chain should observe fiduciary standards in their relationships with their 
clients and customers’115 Interestingly, and perhaps contradictorily, the findings of this 
study suggest that although stewardship has been put forward as a solution to 
investment short-termism and the lack of ownership by institutional investors, in reality 
a lot of trustees believe that their fiduciary duties are pulling pension funds away from 
the original interests of pension fund members towards considerations of investee 
company interests, which are perceived to be far removed from those of the pension 
fund beneficiaries. The findings of this paper suggest that using the concept of 
‘fiduciary duty’ as envisaged by the Stewardship Code is problematic for pension funds 
for a number of reasons.   
Firstly, the interpretation of ‘fiduciary’ standards varies significantly from fund 
to fund. The legal concept of fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of pension fund 
beneficiaries gives trustees flexibility in dealing with uncertainty and problems in the 
investment and management of pension fund assets. Such flexibility has resulted in 
marked differences in pension fund trustee understanding of what it actually means to 
act in the ‘best interests’.  The implementation of the concept of fiduciary duties in 
practice seems far removed from the notions of corporate stewardship and engagement 
because the majority of trustees interpret their fiduciary responsibilities in a very narrow 
                                                 
115 Kay Review, above n 91, 12, Principal 5.   
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way as ensuring that pensions are paid by producing the best possible monetary returns 
on investment. Thus, our evidence suggests that there is a disconnect between the legal 
definition of fiduciary duties and the application of such duties in practice, where some 
pension fund trustees believe that the law precludes them from ‘unjustifiably’ spending 
pension fund resources on engagement and considering non-financial factors.  
Secondly, although the general law concept of fiduciary duty is sufficiently 
flexible to allow ESG concerns to be taken into account,116 it does seem to conflict with 
the regulatory framework within which pension fund trustees operate. Namely, as a 
principle of general law a person acting as a trustee has to act in accordance with the 
terms of the trust117.  This would normally be set out by the settlor (the creator of the 
trust) in the trust deed. Stewardship as a relatively new concept has not been explicitly 
included in the terms of the pension fund trusts. Similarly, Stewardship is not looking 
to create legal obligations on the trustee but to set out ethical guidelines for trustees who 
                                                 
116  See Section 5.76 of The Law Commission Final Report on Fiduciary Duties of Investment 
Intermediaries (2014) [https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-
11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2015/03/lc350_fiduciary_duties.pdf] ) (accessed 30 October 2018) and section 
20 of the DWP Consultation on clarifying and strengthening trustees investment duties (July, 2018) 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7169
49/consultation-clarifying-and-strengthening-trustees-investment-duties.pdf (last visited 30 October 
2018)]. 
117 See The Pensions Regulator summary of the Duties and powers with the key duty is to act in line with 
the trust deed and rules [http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/trustees/role-trustee.aspx [last visited 
30 October 2018].  
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would have to comply with the terms of the trust under which they act. Some trusts118 
will also have statutory overlays such as the Trustee Act 2000 or for charities (the 
Charities Act) and pensions (the Pensions Act). For example, see the Charity 
Commission’s guidance119 or the guidance from a local authority in relation to its 
pension scheme120 . From these examples, it is clear that the Stewardship Code is 
guidance and not a legal obligation.  A trustee who had reservations about a particular 
investment decision (remembering that trustees may be personally liable for breaching 
the law in respect of investment decisions) can apply to the courts for a direction as to 
whether it is proper to make that investment or indeed a decision can be challenged in 
some cases by other trustees or the beneficiaries of the trust. 
Thirdly, there is also a matter of delegation. Under the duty of care121 and PERG 
10.3 trustees delegate the day to day management of the pension scheme investments 
to avoid the need for authorisation under the FSMA122. In this regard, in order to be an 
effective delegation, it can be argued (and our interviewees did argue this) that if 
                                                 
118 Trustees under English law trusts are not a separate legal person. Scottish law is arguably different on 
this point.  
119 Charity Commission for England and Wales (2018) Guidance The essential trustee, what you need to 
know, what you need to do.   
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7342
88/CC3_may18.pdf [last visited 30 October, 2018].   
120  Lancashire Council trustee guidance on Fiduciary Duties relating to ethical considerations 
http://council.lancashire.gov.uk/documents/s20901/Fiduciary%20duties%20and%20ethical%20invest
ment%20Appendix%20A.pdf [last visited 30 October 2018].  
121 See our earlier discussion section on the Duty of Care  
122  See PERG 10.3 for occupational pension schemes (OPS) 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/PERG/10/3.html [last visited 30 October 2018].     
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trustees undertook any active monitoring of investee companies, this might bring them 
within the scope of regulation and potential liability which they clearly did not want to 
be (see Q8 under PERG 10.3, which outlines the type of decision a pension fund trustee 
can make without being authorised by the FSMA)123 . The Pension Regulator also 
provides a summary of trustees’ duties and powers with regards to delegation124.  
                                                 
123 PERG 10.3 Pension Scheme Trustees https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/PERG/10/3.html 
[last visited 30 October 2018]. For example, trustees ‘…can make: strategic decisions, such as decisions: 
about the adoption or revision of a statement of investment principles as required by relevant pensions 
legislation; or about the formulation of a general asset allocation policy; or about prescribing the method 
and frequency for rebalancing asset classes, and the permitted ranges of divergence, following the setting 
of the general asset allocation policy; or about the proportion of the assets that should constitute 
investments of particular kinds; or affecting the balance between income and growth; or about the 
appointment of fund managers; or as to which pooled investment products to make available for members 
to choose from under a money purchase scheme’ 
124 According to The Pensions Regulator; ‘Where the trust deed and rules allow you to delegate a power 
and you do so, you remain accountable for the actions taken. However, where you have delegated 
responsibility for investment decisions, your liabilities are generally more restricted. This is as long as 
you can show that you and the other trustees took appropriate steps to satisfy yourselves of the matters 
set out above’.  http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/trustees/role-trustee.aspx [last visited 30 
October 2018]. 
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It is important to clarify that the law does not oblige ‘best interests’ to be 
interpreted solely in terms of financial best interests125. A more recent FCA’s discussion 
paper on fiduciary duties provides further clarifications on this matter126.  
                                                 
125 See Fair Pensions, (2011), The Enlightened Shareholder - Clarifying Investors’ Fiduciary Duties 
[available at: 
http://shareaction.org/sites/default/files/uploaded_files/policy/EnlightenedFiduciaryReport.pdf], p. 18; 
See also Section 5.76 of The Law Commission Final Report on Fiduciary Duties of Investment 
Intermediaries (2014) [https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-
11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2015/03/lc350_fiduciary_duties.pdf] ) [last visited 30 October 2018] and 
section 20 of the DWP Consultation on clarifying and strengthening trustees investment duties (July, 
2018) 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7169
49/consultation-clarifying-and-strengthening-trustees-investment-duties.pdf [last visited 30 October 
2018]. For example: ‘“20.Our proposed Regulations are intended to reassure trustees that they can (and 
indeed should): 
• take account of financially material risks, whether these stem from investee firms’ traditional financial 
reporting, or from broader risks covered in nonfinancial reporting or elsewhere; 
• fulfill the responsibilities associated with holding the investments in members’ best interests – whether 
directly or by others on their behalf – not just through voting, but the full range of stewardship activities, 
such as monitoring, engagement and sponsoring or co-sponsoring shareholder 
resolutions; 
• have an agreed approach on the extent, if at all, to which they will take account of members’ concerns, 
not only about financially material risks such as ESG, including climate change, but the scheme’s 
investment strategy as a whole; and 
• use the SIP as a real, effective and regularly-reviewed guide to investment strategy and not as a generic 
‘box-ticking’ document.” 
126 See FCA Discussion Paper 18/5, annex 1 for a summary of their understanding of the position 
(https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/dp-18-05.pdf) FCA distinguishes between the legal 
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Notwithstanding these ongoing clarifications, the current trustee perception 
seems to be that the common law fiduciary duties override any duty that trustees may 
have to comply with the Stewardship Code requirements. If that is the case, extending 
pension fund trustees’ responsibilities to monitoring how their fund managers carry out 
their investment duties and how investee companies comply with proper standards of 
corporate behaviour can presumably only be pursued if the Stewardship Code is 
recognised by the FCA and the Pensions Regulator. The FCA has reopened the “Duty 
of Care” and fiduciary issue with a discussion paper.127  
It becomes apparent that from a legal standpoint, the question of Stewardship 
and its compatibility with ‘fiduciary duty’ should be a question of the legal status of the 
Stewardship Code itself – currently it isn’t law, it isn’t regulation, it isn’t judge-made 
law, therefore it doesn’t get “recognised” and therefore binding.  Under FSMA there is 
provision for the recognition of industry codes but as yet the FCA has not recognised 
any.128 Fiduciary duty and the associated ‘duty of care’ are implicit in the existing 
                                                 
model of “duty of care” and a regulatory one based on the FCA Principles for Business and, presumably, 
on the SMCR for individuals. There are also a number of FCA rules that contain an obligation on firms 
to take ‘reasonable care’ for certain activities. 
127  FCA Discussion paper on the Duty of Care and Potential Alternative approaches (2018) 
[https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/discussion-papers/dp18-5-duty-care-and-potential-alternative-
approaches] [last visited 30 October 2018].  
128 https://www.fca.org.uk/about/recognised-industry-codes)  FCA has issued a policy statement in July 
of this year setting out their “approach”   https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/policy-statements/ps18-
18-industry-codes-conduct-discussion-paper-fca-principle-5 and they have set out the process 
https://www.fca.org.uk/about/recognised-industry-codes-criteria-process for getting recognition of such 
codes, but no codes have been recognised.  
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regulations, but do not seem to being monitored or implemented by the FCA. What is 
required here is much more clarity around the existing FCA rules and when the FCA 
will act if those rules are not followed.  Also, clear explanation about the consequences 
of any action both for the consumer and the firm involved should be provided. For 
example, clear explanation of the circumstances in which action will (not ‘might’) be 
taken by the FCA. Furthermore, a removal of the FCA’s numerous get out clauses and 
words such as ‘may’ or ‘might’ from the regulatory framework when it comes to 
stewardship will be helpful. All in all, there is a need to send the right signals at 
Regulatory level. For the Stewardship Code to have more weight in terms of its 
applicability in practice, it needs to be recognised by the FCA.   
CONCLUSIONS  
This study offers novel empirical evidence, which suggests that the relationship 
between fiduciary duties and Stewardship is ambiguous. This supports the academic 
lack of faith in self-regulation and the ability of the Stewardship Code to have a 
transformative impact on corporate governance.129 The fuzziness of the concept of 
fiduciary duty, in the context of pension funds, where it means different things to 
trustees; the legal obligations of trusteeship that are imposed on them in their capacity 
of managing pension funds and insurance savings as well as the lack of regulatory 
recognition of the Stewardship Code represent significant barriers to pension fund 
acting as stewards of their investee companies.  
                                                 
129 Cheffins, (2010) above n 2; 1004; Arsalidou, above n 12, 415; Reisberg, above n 1, Tilba and 
Wilson, above n 9, 11.    
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Although it is difficult know whether the Stewardship Code will have or has had 
an effect on how trustees understand the content of their duty, or more generally how 
the Code may change understandings of duties over time, the findings of this paper offer 
further explanations as to why stewardship is proving elusive and raise questions about 
the effectiveness of the Stewardship Code and the nature of shareholder activism itself.  
The Pensions Regulator and the FCA should publish more guidance and more examples 
of bad practice, and showcase good practice when it comes to fiduciary duty and 
Stewardship.  
The findings of this paper suggest that there is a need to educate trustees and 
clarify in law that broader considerations than simply financial may fall within the scope 
of fiduciary duties. An important first step towards this goal has been taken by the Law 
Commission in its Final Report on Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries.  
Furthermore, there is a need to design appropriate monitoring for the implementation 
of these mandates.  The current investment mandates are ‘off the shelf’ solutions that 
investment consultants offer to trustees. These investment mandates are developed 
based on the economies of scale, which may not necessarily reflect the individual needs 
of a pension fund.  In order for the mandate to deliver what is actually required for that 
particular pension fund, the trustees need to be absolutely sure that this mandate is able 
to deliver. We then need to decide how do we define ‘value’ and ‘value creation’ and 
what does the delivery of this value proposition look like. There is also a need for a 
decompartmentalisation of ESG factors, which need to be integrated into the investment 
process throughout, rather than a separate ‘add on’ function in a separate department.  
Another possible way forward for stewardship is pension fund engagement with 
their investment fund managers, rather than directly with their investee corporations. 
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The willingness and ability of some trustees to ‘stretch’ the meaning of fiduciary duty 
beyond maximizing returns over short-term by either engaging with companies directly 
or influencing their investment fund seems more realistic in terms of fulfilling the 
aspirations for shareowner stewardship envisaged by The Stewardship Code. To 
achieve this, there needs to be more clarity concerning the connection between fiduciary 
duty on the one hand and long term and responsible ownership by investors on the other. 
The Investor Forum, which has been created by industry practitioners in 2014 with a 
core objective of creating value can also serve as a rectifying mechanism in 
safeguarding the interests of asset owners, asset managers and corporations. Here, 
however, it should be noted that because of coordination and interests problems it has 
not showed willingness to do so.   
Figure 1 The Spectrum of Engagement: Stewardship and Fiduciary Duties  
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